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sian Academy of Sciences.
Established in 1989, the $50,000
Lionel Gelber Prize, given by a Foun-
dation named for the late Canadian dip-
lomat, historian, and writer, is awarded
annually to the winning author of a non-
fiction book in the field of foreign rela-
tions. It was presented to Zubok and
Pleshakov in Toronto on 7 October
1996. The jury citation read:
“Zubok and Pleshakov, two members
of the young generation of Russian his-
torians, have mined recently available
documents to provide new insights into
the inner workings of the Kremlin dur-
ing the critical postwar period. Theirs
is a significant contribution to the lit-
erature: a fresh and superbly researched
appraisal of the ideological, strategic
and human foundations of the Cold War,
from the Soviet side. This is a praise-
worthy book in the best traditions of
what Lionel Gelber sought to encour-
age on behalf of readers everywhere:
impressive without being intimidating;
learned without being impenetrable;
engaging without being superficial.”
38 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
ANATOMY OF A THIRD WORLD
COLD WAR CRISIS:
NEW EAST-BLOC EVIDENCE ON
THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1977-1978
Editor’s Note: The Russian and East German documents presented below illuminate the “other side”—other sides, really—of one of
the key events that hastened the collapse of U.S.-Soviet detente in the mid-1970s: the Horn of Africa Crisis of 1977-78, in which a
regional rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as domestic political instability in both countries, became entangled with super-
power rivalry and competition for influence in the Third World. While Ethiopia and Somalia had a long-standing dispute over their
borders, the immediate causes of the crisis dated to 1974, when a leftist revolution overthrew Ethiopian leader Emperor Haile Selassie,
who had been a pillar of Western influence for decades, and to early February 1977, when the Ethiopian revolution took a more militant
course when Haile Mengistu Mariam seized control of the ruling “Derg” and eliminated his chief rivals for power, including Teferi
Bante, the revolution’s erstwhile leader.
The Ethiopian Revolution opened up new possibilities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region, where its chief ally
had been Somalia, with whom it had concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. As the documents show, the Soviet Union and
its allies, notably Cuban leader Fidel Castro, attempted persistently to keep both Ethiopia and Somalia within the socialist camp. This,
in practice, meant trying to damp down Ethiopian-Somali hostility and, in particular, the territorial ambitions of Somali leader Mohammed
Siad Barre, who claimed that ethnic Somalis were being persecuted in the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia and deserved liberation and
incorporation into Somalia proper. In the course of trying to mediate the dispute, Moscow and Havana found that appeals to socialist
international solidarity could only go so far in overcoming deep-seated national and even tribal disagreements.
Still—as demonstrated by a relatively cordial discussion between U.S. and Soviet diplomats in Addis Ababa in early 1977—the
simmering regional hot-spot did not erupt into a full-blown superpower clash until the late summer, when Somalia launched an offensive
to capture the Ogaden from Ethiopia. By then, sensing that the Ethiopian leadership was tilting toward Moscow, both the Siad Barre
regime in Mogadishu and the Carter Administration in Washington were exploring the possibility of improving U.S.-Somali ties to the
detriment of the Soviet Union, and Siad Barre evidently believed that Washington had flashed him at least a dim green light to attack
Ethiopia (a claim which U.S. officials denied).
The Somali attacks of July-August 1977, shattering a Soviet mediation effort then taking place in Moscow, quickly achieved major
success at thrusting into Ethiopian territory; by September-October, Somali or Somali-backed forces had captured most of the Ogaden.
The Somali advances prompted desperate pleas from Mengistu for Soviet-bloc military support, and at some point that fall the Soviet
Union and Cuba, which had already been providing some weapons to the Derg, decided that it would be unacceptable to allow Ethio-
pia—a strategically significant country seemingly poised to become an important member of the socialist bloc—to suffer a military
defeat at the hands of a country (Somalia) which despite protestations of socialist orientation seemed to be quickly shifting into the
“imperialist” camp.
The decision by Moscow and Havana to come to Mengistu’s rescue became evident between November 1977 and February 1978, as
Soviet planes and ships transported roughly 15,000 Cuban troops and large supplies of Soviet weaponry, and a USSR military mission
led by Gen. Vasilii I. Petrov helped direct Ethiopian-Cuban military activities. The massive Soviet-Cuban airlift spurred an Ethiopian
counter-offensive which evicted Somali forces from the Ogaden and entrenched the Mengistu regime in power.
At the same time, these developments cemented both Somalia’s defection from the Soviet-bloc (in November, Mogadishu abrogated
a 1974 Somali-Soviet friendship treaty) and Ethiopia’s dependence on that same Soviet-bloc for military aid, and elevated the conflict to
a superpower crisis, as Washington charged Moscow with employing Cuban proxy forces to expand its influence in Africa. Moscow and
Havana maintained that they had only helped Ethiopia defend itself from a U.S.-backed assault from Somalia (and various “reactionary”
Arab countries supporting it), whereas Carter Administration hardliners (notably National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski) as-
serted that the Horn crisis, coming on the heels of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola, revealed a rising international assertiveness
on the Kremlin’s part, a danger requiring a tough American response—if not a direct military involvement to stem the Soviet-Cuban
recapture of the Ogaden (or a perceived threat to Somalia), then in the form of a closer relationship with the People’s Republic of China,
the USSR’s bitter communist foe.
This new dispute between the USSR and United States flared up in late 1977 just as it seemed that, after a rocky start, the Carter and
Brezhnev leaderships were finally beginning to make some progress toward improving relations, and, most importantly, toward conclud-
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 39
ing a SALT II treaty. Instead of finishing up the arms control treaty—which the Soviets had made a prerequisite for a Carter-Brezhnev [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]