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be judged by the same tests as a system of government. The punish-
ments of the state can scarcely hope to be anything more than deterrent
and preventive, and, since this is so, that state is in the most healthy
condition in which the fewest punishments are deserved. But if punish-
ment has, in education, the higher function of a stage in a necessary
moral process, it would follow that a system of education is none the
worse because it does not prevent children from deserving punishment
provided, of course, that it affords a reasonable probability that they
will get what they deserve.
Chapter VII: The Conception of Society as an
Organism
189. Hegel s tendency to exalt the state, and society generally, at the
expense of the individual citizen, is one of the most striking characteris-
tics of his system. It is one, moreover, in which Hegelians, as a rule,
have faithfully followed their master.
The exaltation in question is not identical with a desire to increase
very largely the functions exercised by the state. It involves indeed, al-
most necessarily, the extension of those functions beyond the limits al-
lowed them by the stricter Individualists. But it would be quite consis-
tent with an amount of individual liberty which would prevent the result
being classified as Socialism or Communism. And, on the other hand, it
is quite possible to propose a system of the most rigid Socialism or
Communism, and yet to disagree entirely with Hegel s view of the dig-
nity of the state. This was, to a large extent, the position of the older
Socialists, such as Robert Owen.
We may best define Hegel s position by contrasting it with its oppo-
site. That opposite is the theory that the state and society are merely
external mechanisms for promoting the individual welfare of the indi-
vidual citizens. This theory does not, of course, involve that each citizen
cares only about his own welfare. But, if he cares about the welfare of
others, he regards them as an aggregate, each of whom has a welfare of
his own, not as a whole, whose welfare is one and the same. Again, this
theory does not assert that the state was formed by the agreement of
individuals who were before isolated, nor that the machinery, which the
state and society give, could possibly be dispensed with by the indi-
152/John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart
vidual. But, in whatever way the union was first formed, and however
indispensable it may be, we can only justify its existence on the ground
that it is a common means to the separate ends of the citizens. To this
view Hegel opposes the assertion that society is more than a merely
external means.
I maintain that there is nothing in Hegel s metaphysics which logi-
cally involves this view of society. On the contrary, it seems to me that
such a system of metaphysics involves the view that the present condi-
tion of society, and any possible form of the state, can only be looked on
as means to the welfare of the individuals who compose them. That
welfare, indeed, can never be found in isolation, but may be found in.
very different combinations.
190. Hegel s own view on the subject is generally expressed by
saying that the nature of society is organic. This phrase, so far as I
know, is not used by Hegel himself. And it does not seem to be very
accurate. An organic unity is, in the ordinary meaning of the term, such
a unity as binds together the different parts of a living body. And, what-
ever may be the unity which exists in society, it would seem clear that it
cannot, on Hegelian principles, be the same as that of the parts of a
body. Self-conscious persons, such as make up society, are far more
individual than a hand or a foot. Now, according to Hegel, the greater is
the individuality of parts, the closer is the unity which can be estab-
lished between them, and the deeper must we go to establish it. It fol-
lows that self-conscious persons will need a deeper and more funda-
mental principle of union than suffices for the parts of a body, and, if
they are joined by a principle adequate for the purpose, will form a unity
far closer than that of the parts of a body. And to call such a principle
organic seems unreasonable. It is true that it comprehends and surpasses
the principle of organic unity. But, if this were a reason for calling it
organic, it would be an equally good reason for calling an organic unity
mechanical, and for calling a mechanical unity a mathematical aggre-
gate.
The use of the word organic, therefore, seems to me incorrect, and,
not improbably, misleading. But since it is used by most of the writers
of the present day who follow Hegel in this question, I shall adopt their
phraseology while I am considering their views.
Hegel takes the State (Der Staat) as a higher form of society than
the Civic Community (Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft). He expresses the
distinction between them as follows:  Were the state to be considered as
Studies in Hegelian Cosmology/153
exchangeable with the civic community, and were its decisive features
to be regarded as the security and protection of property and personal
freedom, the interests of the individual as such would be the ultimate
purpose of the social union. It would then be at one s option to be a
member of the state. But the state has a totally different relation to the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]