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mobilization in the context of a natural mobilization required by a protracted emergency.
FACTORS AFFECTING MOBILIZATION
2. Time. The major factor for consideration on mobilization is the time required to prepare
and establish the mobilization base. If the term "training for war" is to be meaningful, our
peacetime training system must be capable of converting quickly to a wartime posture.
3. Doctrine. A common tactical doctrine based on operational requirements is required in
peacetime to permit both the Regular Force and the Militia to train towards common objectives.
4. Training Areas. Large training areas are required on mobilization and although these
may not be required in peacetime, they must be readily available in the event of an emergency.
Ranges will also be required on short notice for small arms and longer range weapons such as
tanks, artillery, guided missiles and tactical air.
5. The Militia Organization. In WW II and Korea the militia played a major role and
supplied the military backbone on which the wartime structure was established. In an emergency
there may be a requirement to create balanced battle groups from the militia. Therefore, the
peacetime organization should be structured and tasked as closely as possible to this requirement.
6. Instructors. When large numbers of individuals are being mobilized there is an urgent
need for instructors. Since time is available for instructor training in peacetime, units should
maintain the highest standard of instructional ability possible.
7. Recruiting. Experience has shown that the militia armoury became a focal point on
mobilization, and recruiting was generally carried out from there. In peacetime, there should be a
close relationship between the Regular Force and militia recruiting systems so that the two can be
effectively integrated on mobilization.
TRAINING
8. Experience confirms that considerable time was lost during WW II and Korea during the
conversion to wartime courses. Training standards should change from teaching multiple skills to
that of selective operations, equipment or skill-oriented training. Only essential training material
is required in the trade specifications and standards. Courses in peacetime can be longer and
more thorough. However, training priorities must be established beforehand and mobilization
course standards written and reviewed periodically in peacetime so that in an emergency they are
readily available. Lesson plans supporting mobilization standards should also be written and
retained by branch schools and militia units.
9. During the mobilization period, experience has shown that there is an urgent requirement
for experienced officers and NCOs for training schools, HQ, logistic depots and recruiting
centres. In past conflicts, many older officers and NCOs volunteered to rejoin their units. They
took over senior appointments at the unit level but because of their age they eventually had to be
replaced with younger leaders. In the future, young officers should be selected for unit
appointments, and the older and more experienced officers posted to training schools and depots
where their expertise can be used to the best advantage. The selection process for officers, NCOs
and NCMs must be well established in peacetime, so that it is effective on mobilization.
FIELD TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
10. The most efficient method of training soldiers in an emergency is to train them under
realistic field conditions. Training standards must reflect the fighting skills a soldier requires in
war. These skills must be constantly refreshed at reinforcement depots and at formation battle
schools to ensure that reinforcements are fully trained when they join their units.
STAFF COLLEGES
11. On mobilization there is a definite requirement for staff courses to train officers for both
command and staff appointments. Since time is the critical factor, the peacetime course curricula
from the staff colleges will have to be condensed. These abbreviated courses must be developed
in peacetime to be immediately available for implementation when the mobilization plan is put
into effect.
REGIONAL/FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
12. Experience demonstrates that to have effective functional control over the recruiting,
equipping and training of soldiers, the military agency responsible should have operational
control over the particular regions in Canada where militia and Regular Force units, bases and
training areas are situated. The restoration of the Land Force Areas will allow this to occur.
SUMMARY
13. A mobilization plan must be realistic, simple and ready to be implemented on short
notice. Commanders and staffs at all levels of command must be familiar with its concepts and
priorities, and it should be exercised periodically in peacetime. The priorities of training for each
trade and classification must be recorded and understood so that little time is lost during the
critical initial stages of mobilization.
CHAPTER 6
EXERCISES WITHOUT TROOPS
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
GENERAL
1. This chapter and the related annexes discuss the preparation for and conduct of the
following types of exercises without troops:
a. indoor study periods;
b. tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs);
c. telephone exercises;
d. command post exercises (CPXs); and
e. war game assisted Ms.
SECTION 2
INDOOR STUDY PERIODS
AIM
1. Indoor study periods can be held at any level to teach, discuss or examine a series of
topics or problems. Examples of tactical subjects for indoor periods on a model at battalion or
equivalent level are:
a. teaching river crossing operations prior to a major exercise;
b. reviewing the theory of combined arms tactics during different phases of war;
c. studying the deployment and command and control of battalion anti-armour
weapons; or
d. teaching crowd dispersal tactics in an internal security scenario.
MODELS
2. Models have the advantage of being able to show whatever ground is appropriate for the
subject under discussion, and they can be rapidly altered for subsequent phases. However, they
oversimplify matters and in tactical discussions concerning the use of ground, models are a poor
substitute for the ground itself as they make no allowance for the "fog of war" or actual fields of [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]